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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to revocation,49 or he may desire to withdraw it altogether. In the
alternative, there could be a provision automatically terminating such
authority upon the termination of the cause for its creation. The
onus, however, should not be on the shareholder alone to revoke the
authority at the risk of a possible injury to his interests by an
unauthorized act.
LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF THE DIVISIBLE DIVORCE-NEW
PROTECTION FOR THE STAY-AT-HOmE SPoUsE
Immediately upon the performance of the marriage ceremony,
the husband by law, morals, and usage takes upon himself the re-
sponsibility of supporting his wife.1 This duty arises notwithstand-
ing the personal income or wealth of the wife or her ability to provide
for herself and her family,2 and continues until terminated by either
the death of one of the parties,3 or the cessation of the marital rela-
tionship by legal decree without provision for support.4 Thus if the
court did not exercise its discretionary power to award support in
49N. Y. STocK CORP. LAw §47-a(c), (d) (". . . [T]he proxy becomes
revocable after the pledge is redeemed . . . the executory contract of sale...
performed . . . the debt of the corporation . . . paid or [when] the period of
employment . . . has terminated .... ).
IN. Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 51; see Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296,
299, 26 N. E. 2d 265, 266 (1940); Oberlander v. Oberlander, 179 Misc. 459,
467, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 139, 146 (N. Y. Dona. Rel. Ct. 1943); see GRossMAN,
NEw YORK LAW OF DOMESTIc RmATIONS 88 (1947); 41 C. J. S. 404.
2 DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911); see
Clark v. Clark, 203 Cal. 414, 264 Pac. 761 (1928); Davis v. Davis, 65 Cal.
App. 499, 224 Pac. 478, 479 (1924); Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal. App. 288,
200 Pac. 364, 366 (1921) ; Rich v. Rich, 12 N. J. Misc. 310, 171 Atl. 515, 519
(1934); Coleman v. Coleman, 37 Ohio App. 474, 175 N. E. 38, 39 (1930);
Matter of Harper, 288 Pa. 52, 135 Atl. 617, 618 (1927); Mihalcoe v. Holub,
130 Va. 425, 107 S. E. 704, 706 (1921).
3 See Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 410-412, 75 N. E. 236, 237-238
(1905); Barnes v. Klug, 129 App. Div. 192, 195, 113 N. Y. Supp. 325, 328
(st Dep't 1908).
4 Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 Ati. 605 (1936); accord, Lynn v.
Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 97 N. E. 2d 748 (1951); see McCoy v. McCoy, 191
Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377, 378 (1921); Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87
N. W. 340, 341 (1901); People v. Schenkel, 258 N. Y. 224, 226, 179 N. E.
474, 475 (1932). "Unless otherwise provided by local law, a decree of divorce
by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, dissolving the
bonds of matrimony puts an end to all obligations of either party to the other,
and to any right which either has acquired by the marriage . . . except so
far as the court granting the divorce, in the exercise of an authority vested in
it by the legislature, orders . . . alimony to be paid by one party to the
other." Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523, 524-525 (1884).
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an action where both parties have entered an appearance, the duty to
support will not survive the termination.5 But what are the wife's
rights if the husband flees the marital domicile and obtains an ex parte
divorce? Is she divested of her right to support as well as her mari-
tal status? This is the problem which faced the legislature of New
York in 1948 6 and 1953, 7 and which found solution in the enactment
of Section 1170-b of the Civil Practice Act which enables the court
to award maintenance to an ex-wife under certain limited conditions.
Background
In Williams v. North Carolina,8 the United States Supreme
Court decided that a state is bound to recognize a divorce or annul-
ment decree granted by a court of a sister state, whenever that court
has obtained jurisdiction over one of the parties. The decision,
phrased in general terms, did not consider nor decide whether the
decree terminated the incidents of the marriage, particularly the wife's
right to support, as well as the marital status. However, a few years
later in their consideration of a related problem,9 three justices, in
concurring opinions, shared the view that marital status and support
are distinct conceptual entities, each meriting independent considera-
tion under its own separate jurisdictional requirements. 10 While this
recognition of the separability of a divorce decree may not appeal
to the orderly mind, it does have the desired effect," namely, of pro-
viding the court with a basis for awarding support to an ex-wife
whose right to support would otherwise be cut off.
Attempted Solutions
With this recognition of the permissibility of such relief, we find
that although several states have considered this problem, no uniform
results have been reached. New York,12 among other states,' 3 has
S Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 Ohio App. 223, 3 N. E. 2d 667 (1936) ; Wilcox
v. Wilcox, 198 Okla. 370, 178 P. 2d 874 (1947) ; see 27 C. J. S. 944. But cf.
Estin v. Estin, 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947), aff'd, 334 U. S. 541(1948).
6 Senate Introductory No. 2366 (1948) ; see Morton v. Morton, 99 N. Y. S.
2d 155, 166 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
7 Assembly Introductory No. 350 (1953).
8317 U. S. 287 (1942).
9 The case was concerned with whether a prior support provision survived
an ex parte divorce decree.
'
0 See Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 281 (1945) (concurring
opinion).
"1 Ibid.; Russo v. Russo, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 514, 523 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
12 Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 797 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1948). The Supreme Court has no inherent power to grant maintenance to
a woman independent of statutory authority. Ramsden v. Ramsden, 91 N. Y.
281 (1883). There had been no statutory authority in New York.
13 McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31, 107 Pac. 546 (1910); Common-
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refused to aid the wife, holding that a divorce decree ended not only
the marriage but also all its natural incidents; still others, however,
ignoring this view, have attempted to protect the economic interest of
the wife. As early as 1869, an Ohio court,1 4 while apparently rec-
ognizing the ex parte divorce decree, stated that support could be
awarded to an ex-wife, without the aid of statute, since to decree
otherwise would ". . . work a fraud upon the pecuniary rights of the
wife." 15 This decision has been unaffected by the first Williams 16
case which now makes mandatory the recognition of the termination
of the marital status. Whether this recognition ends the right to sup-
port as well as the status has yet to be affirmatively decided by the
Supreme Court. As late as 1952, an Ohio court 17 considered this
problem and once again awarded the wife support, stating that since
there was no prior adjudication of the question of support, the full
faith and credit clause did not apply to property interests. Similar
relief has been granted the wife in other states 18 both before and
after the Williams case, and it is felt that those states whose law was
established prior to the Williams case probably will, as did the courts
of Ohio,19 remain consistent in their decision.
In New Jersey,20 the court is authorized by statute to award ali-
mony to an ex-wife. However, because of a fundamental principle
of New Jersey divorce law, the statute has been so interpreted that
the wife can collect alimony only if the husband caused the marital
rift, and the wife was a successful plaintiff in the prior action.21
New York
In New York, the Supreme Court 22 and the Domestic Rela-
wealth v. Petrosky, 168 Pa. Super. 232, 77 A. 2d 647 (1951); see Common-
wealth v. Esenwein, 348 Pa. 455, 35 A. 2d 335, 336 (1944), aff'd, 325 U. S.
279 (1945).
14 Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869).
25 Id. at 512.
18 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
17 Melnyk v. Melnyk, 49 Ohio Ops. 22, 107 N. E. 2d 549 (1952).
Is Gray v. Gray, 61 F. Supp. 367 (E. D. Mich. 1945) ; Pawley v. Pawley,
46 So. 2d 464 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 866 (1950) ; Thurston v. Thurston,
58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017 (1894); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131
S. W. 977 (1910); Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N. W. 33 (1882).
19 Melnyk v. Melnyk, supra note 17.
20 N. J. Rzv. STAT. tit. 2, c. 50, § 37.
21 "While the section of our statute which confers authority on Chancery
to decree alimony after divorce, does not in terms restrict the authority to cases
in which the wife is the innocent party, yet the nature of alimony imposes the
limitation. . . . Where it is the wife's misconduct that brings about the dis-
solution, the husband's duty to support her ends with the dissolution .. "
Lum v. Lum, 138 N. J. Eq. 198, 47 A. 2d 555, 557 (1946), rez'd on other
grounds, 140 N. J. Eq. 137, 53 A. 2d 309 (1947).22 N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT §§ 1140-a, 1170.
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tions Court,2 3 although authorized to award maintenance and support,
have in the past granted such relief only (1) if there was a valid
existing marriage 24 or (2) in the absence of a marriage, a special
statute authorized such relief.25 Since the New York courts do not
have the inherent power to award alimony,26 they have denied sup-
port to the unprovided-for stay-at-home spouse after a valid ex parte
divorce.27 Some of the lower courts, however, have expressed the
opinion that they do possess the necessary power to award support
in such a situation, but have nevertheless failed to do so. 28 An op-
portunity to resolve this controversy seems to have been presented to
the Court of Appeals but once. However, inasmuch as the specific
issue was not properly before the court, its determination remained
in doubt with the cause being remanded to the lower court with vague
instructions for its disposal.29 That court denied the wife relief on
grounds other than those suggested by the Court of Appeals, 30 de-
claring, however, that such direction did "not preclude the petitioner
from entitlement to maintenance and support .... . 31
23 N. Y. CoNsr. Art. VI, § 18; N. Y. Dom. REL. CT. ACT § 91(2); see
Morton v. Morton, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 155, 167 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950);
Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 959, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 797, 802 (N. Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1948).
24 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1170; see Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 423,
15 N. E. 707, 708 (1888) ("The right to maintain an action for divorce in
this state presupposes the existence of the relation of husband and wife!');
Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 466, 173 N. E. 680, 682 (1930) ("In
every action for separation the primary fact to be proved is an existing
marriage... "').
25 N. Y. Cirv. Pac. AT § 1140-a; see Sparacio, Alimony and the Bigamist,
21 ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 1 (1946).
28 Ramsden v. Ramsden, 91 N. Y. 281 (1883) ; see Weintraub v. Weintraub,
302 N. Y. 104, 108, 96 N. E. 2d 724, 727 (1951); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129
N. Y. 566, 571, 29 N. E. 826, 827 (1892) ; Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N. Y.
456, 458-465 (1884) (containing an excellent historical survey of the acquisi-
tion by the New York courts of the power to award alimony); Gibson v.
Gibson, 81 Misc. 503, 511, 143 N. Y. Supp. 37, 39 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
27 Adler v. Adler, supra note 23. But cf. Lavigne v. Lavigne, 280 App. Div.
854, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 521 (3d Dep't 1952).
28 See Gittelman v. Gittelman, 192 Misc. 334, 337, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 695, 697
(N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1948); Franklin v. Franklin, 189 Misc. 442, 443, 71
N. Y. S. 2d 234, 235-236 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1947). But see Morton v.
Morton, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 155, 161-167 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).2 9 See Franklin v. Franklin, 295 N. Y. 431, 435, 68 N. E. 2d 429, 430
(1946). "On a further hearing . . .consideration should be given to the fol-
lowing provision of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New
York:
"'If the marriage relationship shall have been terminated by final decree
[of divorce] . . . valid in the State of New York . . .an order for support
... [may be] enforced in the family court . . .for the benefit of a child of
such marriage.' (§ 137, subd. 1.)." (emphasis added). Ibid.
30 Franklin v. Franklin, supra note 28. The court held that the wife would
be entitled to support only on the public charge basis but that under the facts
of the case she was not even entitled to relief on this ground.
32 Franklin v. Franklin, supra note 28 at 443, 71 N. Y. S. 2d at 236.
1953]
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Several other New York cases have indicated the desire of the
court to protect the economic interest of the wife against ex parte
divorces. In Estin v. Estin,32 a prior support order granted by a
New York court was permitted to survive the ex parte divorce. The
same effect was given to a private support agreement entered into by
the parties in Russo v. Russo,3 3 wherein the court stated that the
violence done to our public policy by the required acceptance of a
sister state's decree should not be extended to the abrogation of a
contract validly entered into. In still another case, Palmer v.
Palmer,3 4 the court held that even in the absence of a prior support
order or agreement, the wife was entitled to maintenance notwith-
standing the prior divorce. There the wife commenced an in personam
action against her husband for separation. The husband fled to
Nevada and obtained an ex parte divorce, despite an injunction issued
against him by the New York court. In the separation action it was
decided that, although New York was required to recognize the de-
cree of the Nevada court as binding under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, the decree did not affect the court's power
to estop the husband from raising it as a defense in an action by the
wife for support and maintenance.
Following the decision in the Estin case, the New York legisla-
ture made a somewhat inadequate attempt to protect the economic
interest of the wife. Through the enactment of the Uniform Support
of Dependents Act,3 5 New York, in conjunction with forty-one other
states and territories 36 which passed similar legislation,3 7 enabled
certain dependent persons to secure support from the one legally re-
sponsible therefor, although that party is neither before the court
nor has left property in the state where the dependent person resides.
Under its provisions, the dependent can commence a support action
in the forum and, pursuant to the terms of this Act, the respondent
court is authorized to personally serve the defendant, and then to
hear and decide the issue of support. The decision, filed in New
York, becomes part of the record which the respondent can there-
after be compelled to recognize under threat of contempt proceedings
in the latter's state.38 However, the section has proved inadequate.
Administration has been limited to the Domestic Relations Court, and
awards have been nominal. The Act, inasmuch as its enumeration
32296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113 (1947), aff'd, 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
33 62 N. Y. S. 2d 514 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
34 184 Misc. 291, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
35 N. Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS §§ 2111-2120. The purpose of this uniform
act is to secure support in civil proceedings for dependent wives, children and
poor relatives from persons legally responsible for their support. Id. § 2111.
See Legis., 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 162 (1949).
36 See note to N. Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS §§ 2111-2120 in 1953 Cumula-
tive Annual Pocket Part at p. 46.
37 Ibid.
38 N. Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS § 2116.
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of the persons liable for support does not include an ex-husband,3 9
has failed to afford the ex-wife the power to collect the support to
which she is entitled.
The Statute
Despite all these inroads on the effect of the ex parte decree, a
New York court, as late as 1948, still held that it could not grant aid
to an unprovided-for ex-wife.40  In 1953, therefore, the legislature,41
recognizing the necessity of protecting a domiciliary wife against
being cut off from her source of support by a deserting husband, au-
thorized the court to grant maintenance in an action brought by her
for divorce, separation, annulment or the declaration of the nullity of
a void marriage.42  Where the wife submits herself to the jurisdic-
tion of the foreign court, or where she brought the prior action, the
section is inapplicable since by her actions the resulting decree would
be res judicata of all the issues that were, or could have been pre-
sented, including that of alimony.48  It is apparent, therefore, that the
statute has application only where the stay-at-home spouse has been
unsuccessful in her prosecution of the marital action due to her hus-
band's prior procurement of an ex parte decree 44 since success in
that action would have entitled her to alimony under the existing
statutory provisions,45 and the new section would be superfluous.
Thus, the statute does not create an action for support alone, but per-
mits the award of maintenance as an incident to one of the recognized
marital actions.4"
Jurisdiction
The decree of a foreign court is entitled to full faith and credit
only if the court making such decree had competent jurisdiction over
the subject matter to be affected thereby. 47 Thus, in order to under-
stand the jurisdictional prerequisites to its utilization, and finding
no special statutory jurisdictional requirements governing the section
39 Id. § 2113.
40 Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 797 (N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1948).
41 Laws of N. Y. 1953, c. 663.
42 N. Y. Crv. PRac. Acr § 1170-b.
43Ibid.; see 17 Am. JuR. 482.
44 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1170-b.
45 Id. §§ 1155, 1164, 1170.
46 Id. § 1170-b.
47 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 327
U. S. 220 (1946). ".... [T]he judgment as to property rights is not conclu-
sive unless both parties had their day in court." Melnyk v. Melnyk, 49 Ohio
Ops. 22, 107 N. E. 2d 549, 550 (1952). In addition, the petitioning wife must
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of her marital action.
See N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 1147, 1165-a.
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under consideration, 48 we must look to the ordinary requirements for
an alimony decree. Since alimony is fundamentally an in personam
type of relief, 49 the court may award alimony if it has acquired juris-
diction over the person of the defendant. This may be effected by
personal service within the jurisdiction; 50 general appearance in the
action; 51 service upon a designee of the defendant within the state; 52
or consent in advance to the acquisition of personal jurisdiction.5"
However, where in personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained,
but the defendant has property in the jurisdiction, the court possesses
the power to award some relief. In Geary v. Geary 54 the court was
able to award support to the wife of an absent defendant in her sep-
aration action by the use of the property sequestered prior to judg-
ment, pursuant to Section 1171-a of the Civil Practice Act. The
question arises as to whether or not this same procedure may be fol-
lowed where there is no husband-wife relationship to support the
original marital action. Although the language of the sequestration
statute does not preclude an affirmative answer, a close reading of the
pertinent sections of the Civil Practice Act would indicate that this
section would not suffice as a basis for granting the wife relief. Under
Section 1170-b, the wife may be required to make a fictional allega-
tion of a valid marriage. However, Section 1171-a, although allow-
ing a wife, in such an action, to sequester her husband's property so
that it may be applied "... . to the payment of such sums as the court
may deem proper . . . for the support of the wife. . . . ," would
seem to be predicated upon a valid cause of action. While the relief
afforded by the section is not expressly conditioned upon the wife's
success in the marital action, nor upon the dismissal of the wife's
cause for lack of jurisdiction, to allow it to be used in a situation
arising under Section 1170-b where the cause of action alleged may
be fictional, would seem an improper application of the statute.
There is a further provision of the New York Civil Practice
Act which gives the court the in personam jurisdiction necessary for
an enforceable award of support. 5 Under Section 235, the court
obtains personal jurisdiction over the husband provided he is person-
48 Id. § 1170-b.
49 See Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408, 413, 28 N. E. 405, 406 (1891), rezrd
on other growus sub twin. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531 (1896).50 N. Y. Civ. PPAc. Acr § 225; see PRASHKEa, Naw YORK PRAcTicE 122
(2d ed. 1951).51 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 237; see PRASHKER, op. cit. supra note 50, at
123; 27 C. J. S. 1007.52 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 227; see PRAsH=, op. cit. supra note 50, at
122.
53 Ibid. For in personam effect of personal service without the state on a
domiciliary pursuant to Section 235 of the Civil Practice Act see text to note
55 infra.
54 272 N. Y. 390, 6 N. E. 2d 67 (1936). The judgment, however, is effec-
tive only to the extent of the value of the property attached.
55 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 235.
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ally served with process outside New York while still a resident or
domiciliary of this state. However, the use of this section in a situ-
ation arising under Section 1170-b would be a limited one. It would
be necessary for the husband to re-establish his domicile in New
York in order that Section 235 be applicable. If the wife could
prove that he was a resident of this state at the time of the prior
decree, she would at the same time prove that the state granting the
divorce never acquired the jurisdiction necessary to grant a binding
decree.56 In such an instance, the wife could not come within the
protection of Section 1170-b since that section authorizes a court to
award maintenance only if it ". . . refuses to grant such relief [sep-
aration, divorce or annulment] by reason of a finding by the court
that a divorce ... had previously been granted. . ." However, the
wife is not thereby remediless, for in so proving the fraudulent
residence of the husband, she may maintain her own marital action
based on the existence of a subsisting marriage and obtain support
as an incident thereto.57
Finality of the Decree
As in the case of other support provisions of the Civil Practice
Act,58 the court after due notice to the other party may annul, vary,
or modify the relief granted pursuant to this section.59 This statute,
read in conjunction with Section 1171-b of the Civil Practice Act,
has written into every such decree the power to alter accrued as well
as future installments of maintenance. The court may, if it feels
the burden on the former husband has become oppressive and exces-
sive, reduce the amount already owing to the wife.60 However, this
power raises the question as to the recognition that a decree under
Section 1170-b must be accorded by other states. In Sistare v.
Sistare,61 the Supreme Court declared that an alimony decree is en-
titled to full faith and credit provided it is not subject to retrospective
modification by the state granting it. Later, the Court, in Griflin v.
Griffin,62 held that a foreign jurisdiction was not required to recognize
a New York decree fixing an amount due from the husband if he
was not given sufficient notice of the proceedings, on the ground that
it would be a violation of procedural due process to deprive the hus-
band of his right to reduce the amount of accrued alimony. The
r
8 For a court to have the power to award an ex parte divorce, the peti-
tioner must be domiciled in its jurisdiction. If he is not, the decree is not
binding on the other states. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
57 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 1140-a, 1155, 1164, 1170.
58 Id. §§ 1140, 1140-a, 1155, 1170.
59 Id. § 1170-b. "The court, by order, at any time thereafter... may annul,
vary or modify such judgment."
6oId. § 1171-b.
61218 U. S. 1 (1910).
62 327 U. S. 220 (1945) ; see Note, 21 ST. Joi's L. REv. 49 (1946).
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cause was then remanded to the lower court for a determination of
the wife's right to collect the accrued amount, based on the original
divorce and alimony decree. Whether, therefore, a foreign court will
recognize a wife's rights arising under Section 1170-b remains in
doubt. There appears to be authority both for and against this
proposition.63 It would seem that to insure recovery to a wife in an
out-of-state action, the wisest course would be a proceeding under
Section 1171-b to reduce the support order to final judgment.
Constitutionality
Due to the unsettled nature of our divorce laws as well as the
divergence of opinion among the members of our courts, as well as
the Supreme Court,64 it is highly probable that this section will be
contested as being violative of the full faith and credit clause. Article
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution requires that full
faith and credit be given in each state to the ". . . judicial Proceed-
ings of every other state." It is applicable, however, only when the
court rendering the judgment or granting the decree has competent
jurisdiction over the action.65 While prima facie recognition must
be given to the judgment or decree of a sister state, the question of
jurisdiction is always open to re-examination by an interested court,
and if the original court did not have the proper jurisdiction then the
issue there determined can be the subject of further litigation.
Applying these rules to the problem under consideration we find
that every marital action in which support is sought has a dual aspect
-partly in personam (alimony) and partly in rem (divorce).66
Therefore if a court has only in rem jurisdiction, its decision, even if
ostensibly applied to both the marital status and support, will be
entitled to full faith and credit only as to the part over which the
court had jurisdiction. Since there is only in rem jurisdiction in a
valid ex parte decree, only that part of the decree affecting the marital
status of the parties will be recognized and ". . . the divorce decree
is not entitled to full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance
and support." 67
63 See Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign "Non-Final" Alinwny and Support
Orders, 53 CoL. L. REv. 817 (1953). The Supreme Court has expressly re-
fused to state whether a judgment for accrued alimony, which is subject to
modification, is entitled to full faith and credit. See Barber v. Barber, 323
U. S. 77, 81 (1944).
64 In many recent cases on domestic relations including the Williams, Estin
and Esenwein cases, the judges have filed dissenting or concurring opinions.
These dissenting and concurring opinions are recognized by the justices as a
warning that the minority does not consider the question closed. See 31 A. B.
A. J. 113, 167 (1945).65 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).66See Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408, 412, 28 N. E. 405, 406 (1891),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531 (1896).
67 Franklin v. Franklin, 189 Misc. 442, 443, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 234, 235 (1947).
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Although the purpose of Section 1170-b of the Act is not to
protect the wife from domestic ex parte decrees, but rather from for-
eign decrees, the section has been made so applicable. 68 The reason
for this inclusion is to comply with the caveat of Justice Frankfurter
in Esti v. Estin 69 to the effect that there must be no discrimination
between domestic and foreign decrees. Aside from this precaution-
ary factor, however, the application of Section 1170-b to a domestic
decree is unnecessary since New York courts have for several years
possessed the power to add a support provision to a marital decree
granted in this state at any time after final judgment.70
Conclusion
This section appears to be a laudable addition to the law of New
York pertaining to support, for its beneficial effect extends not only
to the wife and her domicile but also to the development of a sounder
national policy towards the divorce problem. A wife will be bene-
fited by the statutory assurance that her husband cannot avoid his
duty of support by obtaining an uncontested divorce. The State of
New York will benefit from the continued support of the wife since
the possibility of the wife becoming a public charge will be reduced.
In addition the section may tend to stabilize the basic unit of our
society, the family, by reducing the number of divorces, especially
ex parte, obtained by errant husbands. Section 1170-b will force a
husband either to support his wife or to withdraw both himself and
his property from the state. The only person adversely affected by
the statute will be the husband who has attempted to escape his con-
tractual duty. No longer will he be able to force his wife to follow
him to, and litigate her right to support in, the forum chosen by him.7 '
It must be remembered, however, that the husband may still obtain
a binding divorce from his wife in an action in which she does not
appear. The husband's economic status alone, not his marital status,
is affected.
Moreover, the statute should lessen to a certain degree the en-
croachment of the divorcing state on the sovereignty of the wife's
forum. Because of the joint effect of Article IV, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution and the first Williams case, the divorcing
state is allowed to force its judgment upon a sister state which has
jurisdiction over the marital res and an equally strong, if not stronger,
68 See 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), REPoRT, N. Y. LAw REvisioN Commis-
SlOW (1953) (New York Legislative Service Advance Sheet).6 334 U. S. 541 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See also note 68 supra.
70 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 1140-a, 1170.
71 Since the wife could not obtain relief here she would have to go to the
state which had jurisdiction over the husband and petition that court for ali-
mony or attack the decree on jurisdictional grounds.
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interest in the relationship of the parties.72 This recognition of the
decree as terminating the marital status of the parties is necessary
for the benefit of the federal union.73 Nevertheless, since the same
considerations are not applicable to the incidents of marriage,7 4 Sec-
tion 1170-b appears to escape constitutional censure.
In order to guarantee the ex-wife the maximum economic pro-
tection provided for by Section 1170-b, she should be permitted to
obtain the authorized support even if the New York courts cannot
obtain jurisdiction over the husband or his property. It is submitted
that this might be accomplished by amending the Uniform Support
of Dependents Act to include in its definition of persons liable for
support, an ex-husband, thereby providing that notwithstanding the
fact that he has obtained in any state or country a final ex parte de-
cree of divorce, he shall be deemed legally liable for the support of
his former wife.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Development of New York City Transportation Facilities
In 1827, Abraham Brower offered for the price of one shilling
to transport passengers in a specially constructed carriage along
Broadway as far as Bleecker Street, thus instituting the first urban
transportation system in the United States.' Several years later
horse-drawn omnibuses carried passengers from the Battery to Bond
Street for twelve and one-half cents.2 By 1835, over one hundred
of these omnibuses regularly transported passengers in New York
City; by 1855, 593 omnibuses were licensed to carry passengers
over twenty-seven established routes.4 Despite this phenomenal ex-
pansion and widespread popularity, the omnibus was soon outmoded.
Competition from a newly developed method of transportation-the
72 Since divorce jurisdiction depends on control over the marital res, the
fora of both the husband and wife have concurrent power to grant a decree.
The forum of the wife, however, has a greater interest in the incidents of the
marriage, especially support, inasmuch as it may be called upon to support the
wife should the husband fail to perform his duty.
73 See Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 282 (1948). This rec-
ognition of the divorce decree will avoid bigamous relationships and the stig-
matization of the innocent children of the remarriage.
74See Esenwein v. Commonwealth, supra note 73; Russo v. Russo, 62
N. Y. S. 2d 514, 522 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
I MILLER, FARES, PLEASE! 1 (1941).
2 Id. at 5.
3 Ibid.
4 Hecker, History of Urban Transportation in PRINCIPLES OF URBAN
TRANSPORTATION 1 (Mossman ed. 1951).
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